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Analysis of EPS AKA
EPS AKA is evolved from UMTS AKA and follows the realization mode of "challenge/response" under the precondition of mutual successful authentication. Some fundamental elements of UMTS AKA, such as USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module), have been reused in EPS AKA. However, compared with UMTS AKA, the security infrastructure and encryption in EPS have been modified for security enhancement.
Authentication procedure of EPS AKA
In EPS, Mobility Management Entity (MME) plays a role comparable to that of the Visitor Location Register(VLR), moreover, the MME performs additional functions. The User Equipment (UE) and the Home Subscriber Server(HSS) play the similar roles in both EPS AKA and UMTS AKA, in addition, the UE includes the Universal Subscriber Identity Module(USIM) and Mobile Equipment(ME) in this article. An overview of the EPS AKA procedure is shown in Figure 1 . There is no self-contained description of the EPS AKA procedure in the main references for EPS security [4] , the EPS AKA procedure in Figure. 1 is described by adapting and explaining relevant text from [3] and [4] .
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Figure 1. Procedure of EPS AKA protocol
The detailed procedure of EPS AKA protocol is described as follows: 1. When the user registers for the first time in a serving network, the user identity request is invoked by MME in the serving network; 2. As the response, UE sends its IMSI to MME. And MME transmmits the authentication data request to the HSS with the IMSI, SNID(Serving Network Identity) and the serving network type. 3. Upon the receipt of the Authentication Information Request from MME, the HSS may have precomputed authentication vectors available and retrieve them from the HSS database, or it may compute them on demand. 4. The HSS sends an Authentication Information Answer back to the MME that contains an ordered array of n EPS authentication vectors AV(1…n). If n  1 the EPS authentication vectors are ordered based on sequence number. Standard [4] recommends n = 1, so that only one authentication vector is sent at a time, because the need for frequently containing the HSS for fresh AVs has been reduced in EPS through the availabilty of the local master key K ASME , which is not exposed in a way similar to CK and IK in UMTS , and hence, does not need to be renewed very often. The Authentication Information Answer consises of 4 parts: a random nunber RAND, an expected response XRES, a local master key K ASME and an authentication token AUTN. 5. UE verifies AUTN and computes RES, CK and IK, then sends the Authentication Response with RES to MME. 6. MME compares RES and XRES for the UE authentication, If matches, the authentication procedure succeeds, otherwise, MME denies the acceess request.
Security analysis of EPS AKA
Compared with UMTS AKA, EPS AKA can get additional security performance as follows [5] [6]: 1) EPS AKA provides implicit serving network authentication, which UMTS AKA does not.
2) The protocol has adopted the layer level cipher key creation mechanism to improve the safety strength of session key;
3) The protocol has adopted the independent serial number ( SQN ) management mechanism and the sequencing storage and usage mechanism of the authentication vector is used to avoid the failure phenomenon of SQN pseudo synchronization [7] .
Nevertheless, EPS AKA still has some key weaknesses: 1) During the subscriber's first time registration, network access, or SN cannot resume the IMSI via Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity (GUTI), SN shall request the UE to send IMSI in plain text, thus IMSI has the risk of leakage, which may suffer the attacks as subscriber location, business tracking and "man-in-middle attack", etc.
2) The wired link among network entities also lacks necessary protection, especially the authentication vector ( AV ) transmitted between HSS and MME via plain text can be easily intercepted.
3) The protocol is still based on symmetric key cryptosystem to realize the mutual authentication between HSS and UE, and create the session cipher key. While the security of long-term shared cipher key relies on the network and can be easily leaked, which has very big impacts on the security of the subsequent local communication.
4) The protocol ignores the protection to service network identity ( SNID ). Both air interface and wired link have the phenomenon of plain text transmission of SNID , the attacker can easily eavesdrops the legal SNID to positively initiate the attacks as pseudo base station or network fraud, etc.
5) The protocol does not support digital signature, and cannot provide the incontestable business. Therefore, it is extremely hard to meet the reliability and flexibility of the next generation network.
Security Enhanced EPS AKA protocol
Aiming at the above mentioned security flaws existed in EPS AKA, this paper proposes a SecurityEnhanced Authentication and Key Agreement protocol (SE-EPS AKA) based on WPKI. 
Notes on nomenclature
Procedure of SE-EPS AKA protocol
Based on WPKI, prior to communication, UE, MME and HSS shall acquire the digital certificate via CA, and acquire the public key. The process of digital certificate acquisition is not described in this
paper, for the detailed acquisition process should refer to REF [8] . Figure 2 shows the process of the SE-EPS AKA, Step 1-Step 7 are the detailed descriptions of this protocol. The subscriber initiates access request: Firstly, UE uses the HSS public key H PK which is stored in smart card to encrypt IMSI and get A. Then UE sends {A, HSS ID } in access request to MME. 2) MME HSS: ,
After MME receives the access request from subscriber, it adopts the public key H PK to encrypt its own network identity SNID , and derive the encryption information B. Then A and B are regarded as authentication data request and delivered to HSS.
3) HSS M M E:
After receiving the authentication data request from MME, HSS uses its own private key H SK to decrypt A and B to get IMSI and SNID . Then HSS checks the validation of IMSI and SNID from registration subscriber list and authorization service network list maintained in the database. If the MME and SN identities have been verified, HSS will generate the random number array (1 ..., ) RAND n ， , and the group of authentication vector (1,..., ) AV n . Figure 3 is the authentication vector generation algorithm.
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Figure 3. The SE-EPS AKA authentication vector generation algorithm
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According to the description of Figure.2 [3] . Finally MME shall encrypt, ( ) RAND i , 
S TMSI
K f RAND SNID and ( ) RES i is regarded as response to subscriber authentication request sent to MME. 6) MME shall compare the ( ) RES i received with the ( ) XRES i of ( ) AV i , if these two ones are consistent, it means that the subscriber is valid, in the next, MME and UE shall regard ( ) ASME K i as intermediate cipher key to create the encryption cipher key ( ( ) CK i ) and integrity cipher key ( ( ) IK i ) for subsequent local communication, otherwise the whole process shall be terminated. 7) UE MME HSS:
The subscriber stores the corresponding relation between S TMSI  and ( , ,
After the subscriber and service network complete the business interaction, UE can also utilize its own cipher key U SK to sign IMSI , SNID and business charging information bill for creating charging evidence{ || || || } IMSI SNID bill sig . Furthermore, in order to prevent from leakage of IMSI and SNID , public key H PK of HSS is once more used, and the digital envelope E. is created. Lastly, this information is transferred to HSS via MME, which can be used as evidence for presence and business participation of MME and subscriber as well as creation of related charging relation. n cannot be decrypted, and ASME K cannot be acquired, even the attacker eavesdrops the data between HSS and MME, or data between UE and MME, it cannot be accessed to the system via the mode of message replay. Therefore, the public key encryption can thoroughly resolve the problem of difficult operation of SQN, and effectively defend the SQN DOS attacks. 2. Since the protocol adopts the public key system, it has good extensibility, furthermore it supports digital signature and can provide the incontestable business.
Conclusions
Aiming at the wireless security, 3GPP propose EPS AKA for supporting the next generation all-IP wireless network. However, by thoroughly analyzing, this paper has found some fatal weaknesses in EPS AKA, which can lead to the information leakage, pseudo base-station attack, etc. In order to prevent the user and access network from malicious attacks, this paper proposes a new WPKI based SE-EPS AKA protocol, which can provide the undeniable digital signature and protect the exchanged information comprehensively. In addition, the new scheme can support the system extension much more efficient than other symmetric key systems. At the end of this paper, the formal verification of the SE-EPS AKA protocol indicates that our new scheme can satisfy the integrity and security.
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